‘Corporate bodies cannot commit crime, only individuals can be criminal, and the law should be framed accordingly.’ Discuss.
The nature of corporate crime is one that has skulked in the shadows of its mainstream, more conventional sister crimes for years – public awareness of white collar crime has certainly increased recently, but there still lingers a vague mystery that surrounds corporate criminal action. In fact, defined by its sophisticated planning and execution, corporate crime often skirts around the legal boundaries and regulations set forth to prevent crime in the first place. Yet perhaps the most intriguing aspect of corporate crime is the balance of its interpretation of an individual’s role within a larger corporate body: whether or not an individual chooses to make conscious decisions within a company, or if he is subject to a higher authority; what if that individual is the higher authority? Still, even with the complex roles that the individual member plays within the system, the corporate body as its own entity functions as a powerful, intelligent force – one that the legal and social systems of society must reckon with in their continuously evolving pursuit of justice… Keep Reading.
Dependence vs. Independence
In their paper Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, Eric Posner and John C. Yoo argue elaborately for the concept that international tribunals that are dependent are more effective than independent international tribunals. Posner and Yoo’s reasons behind their radical claims lie in their skepticism of the claims of effectiveness of independent tribunals. They believe that international law scholars have transferred the logic of independence in the domestic arena to the logic of independence in the international sphere, wrongly relating the consequences of biased domestic judges to the same consequences of biases in international courts. In response to Posner and Yoo’s paper, Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Maria Slaughter published Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, addressing in detail the flaws in Posner and Yoo’s paper. Helfer and Slaughter maintain that international tribunals are highly effective by virtue of their independence, and question Posner and Yoo’s selection bias and murky analyses. The realist in me would have to align with Posner and Yoo, if only because I agree with their overarching argument that states will choose to interact with international tribunals only if the states can be assured that their interests will be protected. However, Helfer and Slaughter do an excellent job of shedding light on the flaws in Posner and Yoo’s methodology… Keep Reading.
Goldsmith and Posner in their book The Limits of International Law prepare several arguments that outline the shortcomings in international law. Importantly, they do not propose that international law is entirely a failure, or that is has no relevance in the international community; rather, they challenge the assumptions that customary international law is “unitary, universal, and exogenous” (25). Goldsmith and Posner seek to explain that the reasons behind the behavioral regulations that we observe as customary international law, may not be as clear as previously thought. They capture four models that describe and capture behavior regularities: coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, and coordination… Keep Reading.